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Human factors issues in UK military aviation are identified and mitigated through a
combination of proactive support and reactive investigations, both of which employ
qualitative data collection and analysis methods. Each piece of work to identify human
factors issues is performed on a standalone basis, but a regular review is undertaken to
identify common trends. In the most recent review of trends, thematic analysis was used
within the framework of the Accident Route Matrix to determine the most prevalent and
qualitatively important human factors issues. The thematic analysis identified a wide
range of human factors issues, including resource availability, training, documentation,
and fatigue. By applying a qualitative approach throughout the data collection and
analysis, it was possible to develop a rich understanding of each trend.
A combination of proactive support (examining normal flying operations) and reactive
investigations (analysing air accidents) are used to identify and mitigate Human Factors (HF) issues in
UK military aviation.
Proactive support is provided through the conduct of Operational Events Analysis (OEA, Revell,
Harris, and Cutler, 2014). The OEA is a proactive and preventative approach, which examines typical
military aviation operations and uses that information to identify HF issues which are influencing the
work of the unit. OEA involves an HF specialist attending a unit for a period of time, typically between
five and ten days. During that visit the specialist will conduct semi-structured interviews with a cross
section of personnel on their experience of working on the unit. The specialist will also observe work on
the unit such as flight planning, debriefing, engineering tasks, and team meetings. The information
gathered during the visit is then analysed qualitatively to identify HF issues which could influence flight
safety and specify the role those issues may play in an accident.
UK military air accidents are investigated by a Service Inquiry (SI) panel. Each SI panel is
supported by a number of advisors, including an HF specialist. The HF specialist supports the panel in
the collection of HF evidence and throughout the analysis phase. The HF specialist also determines where
HF issues could have contributed to the accident. The HF specialist then prepares a report for the SI
panel which characterises each relevant HF issue and their role leading up to, during and immediately
post-accident (Harris, 2011).
The proactive support and reactive investigations use a common framework to analyse HF issues,
which is known as the Accident Route Matrix (ARM). The ARM was developed by Harris (2016), by
adapting the Human Factors Analysis Classification System (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003) into an
investigation matrix. As shown in Figure 1, the ARM allows HF issues to be presented by both the type
of issue (on the y-axis) and time of effect (on the x-axis). The ARM also identifies the links between the
HF issues and demonstrates how each HF issue is connected to its role in an (actual or potential) accident
sequence (shown by the boxes hazard entry, recovery, escape, and survival).
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Figure 1. Accident Route Matrix.
The ARM is a fundamentally qualitative approach, as it is driven by the content and meaning of
the information gathered. The benefit of such a qualitative approach in accident investigation is that the
investigator can remain flexible during evidence collection and adapt to the nature of evidence available
regarding the accident. The use of qualitative information reflects the richest available information about
the accident, and so maximises the scope to understand why the accident happened. In applying the same
process, used to investigate an accident, in the OEA immediately communicates the value of the OEA
approach and means the OEA has good face validity. Applying a qualitative approach in a proactive
safety investigation also offers benefits in terms of the depth of understanding of the HF issues and the
links between those issues. Such an understanding assists in communicating the findings, demonstrating
the credibility of the work, and in developing recommendations to address the issues identified.
Aviation safety incidents often share root causes and so analysing accidents and normal
operations using the same framework (the ARM) enables common issues to be identified. However, each
accident investigation and OEA is carried out on a standalone basis to ensure the HF input is
appropriately tailored to the context. This enables targeted recommendations to be provided to the unit to
improve safety but raises the risk that common issues and opportunities to address issues at the
organisational level could be missed. Accordingly, a periodic trend analysis is undertaken with the aim of
identifying the most critical trends.
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Method
Data collection
Scope. Twenty reports were identified to act as the data set for the trend analysis. The data set
comprised all the reports produced by the Aviation Psychology Team at the Royal Air Force Centre of
Aviation Medicine (RAF CAM) between March 2013 and May 2015 inclusive. The type of reports
included in this data set are shown in Table 1, the “other” reports refer to parachuting and Air Traffic
Control (ATC).
Table 1.
Reports included in the trend analysis.

Fixed-wing
Rotary-wing
Remotely Piloted Air System
Other
Total

Accident or incident
investigation
2
4
0
1
7

Operational Events
Analysis (OEA)
4
7
1
1
13

Total
6
11
1
2
20

The reports all shared the common qualitative investigative and data analysis procedure, as
summarised in the introduction. The reports each presented the results of that analysis in the form of a
series of descriptions of HF issues. Each description included the nature of the issue and, where possible,
the causes of that issue and its impact on safety.
Analysis
Once the data set had been collated, a thematic analysis was carried out to “identify, analyse and
report the patterns within the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis was chosen as patterns
within the data could be identified and reviewed in an iterative manner until the most prevalent themes
emerged. As such, the process was driven by the qualitative information contained in the reports, but it
also allowed a framework (the ARM) to be applied to the findings.
Data familiarisation and generating initial codes. Initially the reports were reviewed fully.
Once fully immersed in the report contents, the HF issues were identified from the reports and collated so
that very similar issues are grouped into a theme. A theme was defined as the highest level description of
the issue and allowed for grouping later. Where similar but different issues were identified they were
given a high level theme, but that theme was divided into sub-themes. The sub-theme provided more
detail on the nature of the HF issue. For instance, a theme may be at the level of “number of personnel”,
which could be associated with sub-themes of “not enough supervisors” and “not enough instructors”.
During the analysis the titles of the themes and sub-themes were refined to reflect the whole body of
information in the reports.
Categorisation of themes. Once all of the issues had been considered and the themes and subthemes were drafted, they were compared against the ARM and categorised into one of the seven HF
categories used in the ARM: organisation, supervision, task, equipment, environment, behaviours and
actions, and operator conditions.
Reviewing themes and categorisation. After the ARM categorisation was completed, a full
review was performed of the themes, sub-themes, and ARM categories. This comparison was undertaken

003

by a different HF specialist, providing both an independent check of the initial identification of themes
and a check of the suitability of the themes and sub-themes.
Defining trends. The ARM was then scrutinised in terms of the prevalence of each theme and
sub-theme across the reports and its importance to flight safety. From this process, a number of themes
and sub-themes were drawn out from the analysis to form the trends. A description of each trend was
then prepared which was derived from the relevant descriptions in the twenty reports which comprised the
data set.
Results
A total of thirty-one HF trends were identified from the thematic analysis and presented using the
framework of the ARM, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Accident Route Matrix presenting the 31 trends that were identified from the thematic analysis.
Descriptions were prepared for all thirty-one trends. The descriptions comprised a narrative of
the issue, an actual example from the evidence, its causes, and the anticipated consequences of that issue
for flight safety risk.
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Amongst the thirty-one trends it was noted that there were a small number of critical trends which
both prevalent and qualitatively important, and these were highlighted for particular focus and mitigation:
1. Number of personnel. Areas were highlighted where there were limited personnel in
specific roles or with specific qualifications.
2. Training and currency. In all cases, training was provided to personnel to enable them to
perform effectively in their role. However, some limitations were found in the content of
training and in the opportunities to practice skills once trained.
3. Documents and procedures. A common issue in aviation is the high volume of rules,
procedures and regulations. This issue was identified as a trend in the analysis, as it
increased the risk of information being forgotten and so contributing to a procedural
violation. There were also issues identified with the content of documentation – such as
errors within the documents, unclear information, or information spread across multiple
documents.
4. Overall workload. Rather than an issue with on-task workload, the critical trend was that
personnel had a large number of tasks to perform during their working day which was
challenging to achieve in the time available.
5. In-flight Situation Awareness (SA). Difficulties in developing and maintaining SA in-flight
were identified across a number of accident investigations. In OEA, limitations were
identified with the cockpit equipment which could reduce SA in-flight.
6. Distraction. Two types of distraction were noted: In-flight distraction, most commonly
linked to equipment discomfort, and general distraction, linked to uncertainty and frequent
task changes.
7. Fatigue and pressure. There were very few reports of overt pressure being imposed in
personnel, but personnel were highly motivated to achieve their tasks which, when combined
with issues such as lack of personnel and high workload, was acting to impose a perceived
pressure which could also contribute to a risk of fatigue.
8. Experience. Declining experience levels was identified as a critical trend, sometimes linked
to new platforms where experience was naturally low, but also linked to limited opportunities
to practice skills after training.
Discussion
Using qualitative analysis allows a large amount of contextual data, collected in various forms, to
be examined in such a way that the feelings, values and perceptions underlying and influencing
behaviours can be recognised. The language and imagery used by personnel can be captured to further
understand the issues and factors being described in a way that statistical analysis cannot. Using thematic
analysis allows for the identification of patterns and meanings across the data. Themes are developed
from within the data and supported with assertions from grounded theory.
In the current study, combining the use of the ARM framework alongside thematic analysis has
identified the HF issues which are critical trends for UK military aviation units. The analysis generated a
wide range of HF issues which were then examined and explored before identifying the most critical
eight. Each trend was identified based on qualitative data collection and analysis, which enabled an in-
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depth understanding of each issue to be developed, beyond what could have been achieved with a purely
quantitative approach.
The nature of the qualitative approach used ensured that the results were evidence based, which
was particularly important when presenting the findings to senior stakeholders to provide confidence in
the conclusions. The nature of the analysis then allowed a detailed and descriptive set of results to be
produced which could be easily and clearly explained to non-aviation psychologists. This clarity is vital in
enabling action to be taken to address the issues identified and to guide decision making regarding the
operational risks in military aviation.
The results of the trend analysis have been presented to senior personnel within the UK military
to further aid their understanding of HF risks. Recommendations have been developed to address each of
the eight critical trends at the organisational level, and to develop the use of OEA to support continual
improvement in aviation safety.
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